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LOOMIS: Thissymposiumwas designed to viewthe centralmarket system froma particularvantage pointthatof the regionalexchanges which makesthe view fromWashington notas significantas it would otherwise be. Inview of that,I will notattempt to repeatthe general discussions of thecentral marketsystem which haveappeared invarious publishedstatements over theperiod since1971. I haveeven madea couple of speechesabout thatsubject myselfin recenttimes. Thegeneral
ideal andconcept, as distinctfrom anyparticular detailsof thesystem,
were,Ibelieve,foreshadowed inthe quotationfroni thenstitutional
Investor StudyReport thatopens and providesa theme for thisconference.
There issome debateas to whether thecentral marketsystem originated with theSecurities andExchangeCommission at thatpoint or inWilliam
McChesneyMartin Jr.'sreport to theNew YorkStock Exchangea few months later.At leastwe ted them bya few months. I will notattempt to discussthe threeor four keyaspects of thesystem:
the compositetape, the composite
quotes, and theclearance andsettlement
matter, becausethat wouldmerely duplicatewhat you willhear later from people whohave a closer
acquaintance withthose particularproblems
than I do. Infact, that issomething ofa handicap formy presentposition. I
do not reallyget into thedetails, thetechnology, andthe nuts andbolts of
some of theseproblemsas muchas I would liketo, simplybecause they
are being workedon by others.
The basicconcept of thecentral marketsystem is to linktogether the
existing markets,not to createa new marketto replacethem. Hencewe
refer toa central market
system, not tothe centralmarket. Thisis a process,
not an institution.It is to bean evolution.It willstart with whatwe have
now, and it willgo on fromthere. It willnot be afinished productcreated
all atonce. Somepeople have
suggested thatnot muchshould happen
untilsome kind ofa turnkeycontract forthe centralmarketsystem hasbeen completed and that people should just do things asthey have done
them in the past until the magic day when you can comein and turn the
key and the central market system will be turned on. Itobviously is not
going to happen that way. In view of that, there is no assurance asto how
it is going to evolve, particularly over the long term.I would suspect that,
given modern technology, there is no natural law orstatutory law which
would prevent it from evolving into any particular marketform.
Turning to your particular topic, the fact that therealways have been
regional exchanges does not ensure that there alwayswill be regional
exchanges. Rather, this will depend in large measure onwhat the regional
exchanges themselves do, as well as what the securitiesindustry itself
does. Perhaps a little historical background concerningthe regional ex-
changes would be pertinent here. The regional exchangesstarted many
years ago. They were created to tradelocally in local securities. There was
a necessary place for them inthat process, both because technology did
not make it possible to execute ordersconveniently from a long distance
and because securities were more localized in each region.People were
interested in local securities, and they obviouslytraded them locally.
Neither condition now exists nor has it existed for agood many years. The
regional exchanges do much of their business in securitiesof national
interest which also are traded elsewhere in the country,particularly in
New York. Consequently, some critics havesuggested that the regional
exchanges, or at least some of them, have survived byoffering a means to
escape the rigors of the fixed commissionrate and other practices which
people desire to avoid. This basis of survival, so tospeak, will no longer be
available to the regional exchanges. Regional exchanges can,of course, and
will continue to trade local securities; but particularly inthe last decade or
so, they have encountered increasingcompetition in that area from the
over-the-counter market. In any event, that is not what we arehere to talk
about today. We are talking about the centralmarket system or, as the
members of Congress seem to prefer, the nationalmarket system. I am not
quite sure what that distinction in terminologymeansand I am person-
ally of the view that it does not meanmuchbecause the central market
system concept embodies the idea thatorders will be brought together for
execution no matter where they originate.
The national market system means that it isnational in extent and not
limited to a single city. That, I think, is very importantand is why we are here
today. This does not mean that I do not think theregional exchanges can or
should survive. I think they can, and I certainlyhope they do. I hope so
because there is an important national policyinvolved in preserving, perhaps
not so much a particular floor orfloors in some building, but in preserving
regional financial communities and inparticular regional brokers and re-
gional dealers. However the hardware may becentralized, the people should
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not be. But thereare certain otherconsiderations and problems.The regional stock exchangesshould survive ifthey carve outa niche for themselves,if they provide a usefulservice in the centralmarket system. Ithink this wiltdepend to a significantdegree on theirmaking competizivemarkets anddevising innovative servicesfor investors,as many of them havedone in thepast. If the regional exchangesare to take theirproper place in thesystem, theymust be given a fair chanceto show what theycan do. If they are giventhat chance, then in largemeasure itis up to themto do what theywill withthe opportunity. Buttrying to makesure that they have thatchance involvessome difficult questionsand choices,since investorinterests, particularlyin the tong term,mustat least fromwhere I sitcomefirst. Before comingto these issues thereis an important
threshold questionto be addressed,assuming the desirabilityof a centralmarket system.How do we get there andwhen and whowilt move italong? In thismonth's issue INovember 1974]of Fortunemagazine, thecommission gota considerable going-over. The maintheme of the authorwas that we wereattempting to do things thatwe were notcompetent to do andwhich, inany event, shouldbe done by theprivate sector. Thecentral marketsystem is his primeexample. He seems to thinkthat we shouldjust forget aboutthe centralmarket system, initiate competitiverates promptly, righton schedule, andlet nature takeits course. I do notthinkthat
we can leave itatthat.But we do notwishto design orto impose thecentral marketsystem. We believethis should bedone by the private sector,subject toour scrutiny,or oversightas the congressional people call it,and ourintervention wherenecessary. But theprocess seems to
be goingrather slowly.The WashingtonPost headlinedan articleon the subject lastweek: "TheCentral MarketCrawl." This is,I think,unfortunate. Although Iappreciate thefact that insofaras the creation ofa central market system involvesoutlays of cash,which is nottoo plentiful in theindustry at the moment, theindustrycan reasonablysay that they wouldwant to seean opportunity fora return on thedollar sospent. But asidefrom thisproblem,
which I donot think isoverwhelming,change iscoming, and ifthe industry
does not shapethe change,the changemay shape it ina manner whichit
might not like.
In thisconnection, I willnot talk aboutcompetitiverates because that
subject isinvolved inhearingswe are now holding.
Coming backto the basic
question, therules to bedeveloped forthe centralmarket systemwilt affect
the placeof the regional
exchanges in it,very obviously.This bringsup the
slogan of"equal regulation,"which soundsso reasonablebut may needa
closer took. Ionce collectedsome notorietyby sayingthat equalregulation of
the unequalis inherentlyunequal. Yetin someareas, equalregulation in the
central marketsystem isnecessary. Toillustrate, thereis regulationof short
sellingon the NewYork exchangesand prohibitionof manipulation.These
have not beenmajor problemson the regional






traded issues in the past. The reason isthat basically both bear raidsand most
manipulations succeed only if they give afalse appearance to themarket and
thus influence and cause tradingby others. This was not very easyto
accomplish on a regional exchangewhile the public was not looking.The
composite tape and the compositequotation system will changethat. What
happens on a regional exchangewill be visible from coast tocoast and
overseas. Hence, equalregulation is needed here. Regulationof short selling
in a multiple-market systeminvolves difficult problems andmight call for a
whole new approach in place ofthe traditional reliance onthe latest
print on the tape, particularly as Iunderstand specialists never look atthat
anyhow. Industry people andsell-regulation are making a diligent,good-faith
effort to deal with that problempromptly and effectively, and Ithink they will
succeed.
The regulation of specialists andmarket makers is a different and akey
problem. I will not attempt to explorethat subject in depth, partly because
time will not permit. I think,however, this is an area wherethoroughgoing
equal regulation would be unequal, atleastfor now. For example,
specialists on the New York StockExchange and on the AmericanStock
Exchange have been prohibited for adecade from dealing directlywith
institutions. There were good reasonsfor this. In my recollection,which may
conflict with some other people's version,this grew out of an investigationof
the American Stock Exchange in1961 and 1962. It was foundthat specialists
on that exchangeengaged in a number of different kindsof preferential, if not
illegal, deals with issuers and institutions.The monopoly position of the
specialists made this possible and dangerous.Third-market makers deal with
institutions, and for some this is the majorpart of their business.This has riot
resulted in abuses of power, because theyhad no monopoly. I do not think
that the New York Stock ExchangeRule 113 can or should beapplied to
third-market makers. Possible applicationof such rules to regionalspecialists
is a very live issue, and Iwill not attempt to forecast the answer toit 110W.
The aspect of specialist regulationthat has been most difficultand
important, and to some extentunsatisfactory, over the years has been,in
my opinion, the affirmativeobligation of specialists to make anorderly
market when there is a significant imbalanceof supply and demand. This is
a basic attribute of thespecialist system and has often beencited as its
cardinal virtue, It has also been the mostdifficult to enforce effectively and
the area in which performance hasbeen most uneven. Here thegood
specialist is separated from the bad one.It has sometimes seemed to me,
after a rather frustrating acquaintancewith this problem, particularly in my
years in the Divisionof Trading and Exchanges, that noamount of
regulation seemed to make all specialistsgood specialists, simply because
good specialists quite often lose a considerableamount of money when the
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reasons for the centralmarket system isto introduceCompetiton into this area, with the thoughtthat competitionwill produce betterspecialists than regulation does,because the goodspecalisls shouldin an ideal world,get the orders. Oneof the majorquestions which will haveto concernus all is whether thesystem will workso that the good specialistsdo get theorders; or whether habit,tradition, the easiestway of doing things,or indifference to best executionwill lead brokersto send their businesswhere it ismost convenient for themrather than to thebest specialist, fromwhom their customer wouldreceive bestexecution. That, I think,is somethingI would hope thisconference wouldfocus on becauseI do not have theanswers to it. Regulationoften effectivelyprevents people fromdoing what theyshould not do, hut it is lesseffective in makingthem do somethingthey shoulddo. Returning just fora moment to thelegislation, which isHarvey Rowen's province, all I willsay is that I hope andbelieve that it willpass and that all influencesthat can be broughtto bear to get itdone now wouldbe in the publicinterest. In thatconnection, Imay note that theMidwest Stock Exchange led offour hearingson competitive rates,Tuesday INovember 19, 1974), Theytook the positionthat they favoredcompetitive ratesbut for variousreasons, well articulatedin MichaelTobin's [president,Midwest Stock Exchange)testimony, not untila reasonable periodafter the legisla- tion had passed.He said, somewhat
optimistically, thatthe industrycould go over tocompetitive rateswithout difficultytwo months afterthe legislation isenacted but thatit cannotgo over to it beforethe legislationis in hand. Ifwe attempt togo forward thisspring withoutthe legislation,a disorderlyprogress is quite likelyto occur. DonFarrar hasa very nice,neat time scheduleas to the order andtime in which
everything shouldhappen.
I tend tosubscribe to it;but if we donot get thelegislation,we may not have that kindof progressbecausesome phases of it will,if nobodyobjects
to them,come in beforeother phasesthat somepeople donot like. Some things will betied up inthe courts,and in general,people willnot know
where theyare going. TheSEC senta letter to thechairman of theHouse Committeeon Interstateand ForeignCommerce, andto the ranking minority member,stating its beliefthat enactmentof thelegislation in this
Congresswas essentialto the avoidance
of delay andconfusion, andto
enable thecommission andthe securitiesindustry togo forward with assurance into thefuture for thepublic interest.I hope thatwill occur.
BAKER:Churchill saidin 1945:"I did notbecome HisMajesty's First
Minister topresideover the liquidationof hisempire." Thatcomment told
us a lot about
Churchillbutvery little aboutthe ultimatedisposition of
the empire.The factthat theempire wasa useful nineteenth
century institu-
tion didnot guaranteeits survivalin themid-twentiethcentury. Today, in the
securities industry,we also are beingtreated toa great deal
of picturesquebut irrelevantrhetoric inthe samevein. Itcan be heard incongressional corridors, at Securities and Exchange Commissionhearings,
and almost anywhere else where a few reporters can begathered together
to receive the word.
Tradition can blind us to truth. The truth is that securitiesmarkets exist to
serve the investing and issuing public,rather than to serve broker-dealers.
The "private club" way of life dies hard, but itis dying nevertheless.
The success of a capital market in serving the public ismeasured in three
essential ways: by best market price, by lowest transaction cost,and by
fullest disclosure. This means that business should flow todealers who
make the tightest markets and to brokers who are mostefficient in
searching out the best deal.
Historically, our securities markets have been quite different, Theyhave
been studded with barriers designed to protect ancientprivileges. Commis-
sion rates have been fixed to protect the valueof members' seats, and
trading in other markets has been restricted to protect thevalue of the
specialists' books. When even more ingenious minds wereable to circum-
vent these barriers with a rebate, a four-wayticket, or a PBW Stock
Exchange membership, government was called in torebuild the barriers
and save the ancient privileges.'
However, things have changed markedlyinthe past two years.
Computerized communications technology has eroded theold barriers at
an ever quickening pace, and governmenthas shown little interest in resur-
recting them. The New York Stock Exchange mightwish to retain fixed
commission rates and eliminate the third market, but it i; notgoing to be
allowed to do so.Itmight like to perpetuate its position by asserting
"proprietary" rights over public data, but it is not going tobe allowed to
do that either. Those are the facts of life.
The Department of justice has been an active advocateof change for at
least six years. Once we were the lonely challengers ofixed rates, Rule
394, and similar barriers, but now we have beenjoined by a vigilant
commission and an interested and active Congress.All seem intent on
eliminating the old barriers, on opening the way to a newworld in which
rewards are tied to playing skill, not the color of the player's shirt. A true
central market system would do exactly that: it would allow me tochoose
between brokers on the basis of price and quality of service,and it would
allow my broker to choose between all auction and dealermarkets entirely
on the basis of the price and termsof execution available in those markets.
Such a life may be less comfortable than life in a privateclub, but it is
more likely to weed out thedeadwood, reward the truly skilled, and
generally give the public greater confidence in our capitalmarkets.
Eliminating the ancient barriers is, of course, vital if we are ever tohave
a free-flowing central market;it requires drive, determination, and the
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more flexible futureis even harder;it requires imagination,an appreciation of changingtechnology, andan ability to resist specialinterest pleasol doom.
The trenchwarfare processis well illustratedby the painstaking
process of eliminatingfixed rates. Afterthousands of hoursof SEC andcongres- sional hearingswhichhave failed to showthat a classicprice-fixing cartel is necessaryto serve thepublicthe SEC ishaving to crankup still another round of hearingsto compel theexchanges actuallyto eliminate the practice. This lasthurrah before thecommission is likelyto be followedby court challengesas a means ofpostponing the dayof reckoning.Congress may short-circuitthis process byenacting a statutorytermination offixed rates on May1, 1975. H.R.5050 includessuch a provision. Congress alsomay have an importanthand in thebroader centralmarket development. Asyou know, the SEChas showncommendablevision in working towarda free-flowing centralmarket systemas essentiallya communicationssystem by whichvarious exchangesand marketmakers are tied togetherfor thepurpose of rapidlyexchangingquotations, orders, and completedtransaction data.Unfortunately--butnot surprisinglythe New York StockExchange hasseen the developmentof suchan effective system as a threatto its historicprimacy in theindustry; and,accordingly,
it has resistedthat developmentin a variety ofways. Among otherthings,
the exchangehas insistedthat it hasa "proprietary"right overquotation and transactiondata fromits floor; and,as compensationfor these "rights," itapparently seeksa privilegedposition in thenew system. This would ofcourse be highlyundesirable.Fortunately, TitleVI of H.R.5050 would give theSEC additionalauthority in thisarea and provideit withan
even stronger basisfor rejectingthe NYSE'sclaims of"proprietary" rights. We in theDepartment ofJustice have beenparticularlyconcerned that
the newcentralcommunicationsinstitutions ofthe centralmarket not
come to bedominated bythe self-regulatory
organizations whichhave
dominated themarketplace inthe past.4Central processingmay turn outto
be a monopoly
function,because itturns out tobe characterizedby
pervasive long-run
economies ofscale. If itdoesand itis by nomeans
clear thatit willthanit will haveto be organizedin sucha way that all broker-dealersenjoy





overcharges andother abuses,and this couldbe donemore
effectively if itwere not dominated
by a singleexchangeor sector of the
brokeragecommunity.
Beyond that,thecommissionshould leavethe dooropen as wideas
possible forcompetition inthe centralprocessingfunctions. Evenif com-
petitionwere notnow possible,it mightbecomepossible withfuture
technology.Competitivecentralprocessingwould bepreferable tomonopoly, because it would avoid the need for utility-typeregulation and
would allow the competing central processors to vie witheach other in
developing new communications techniques. This is verymuch the same
type of technological and commercialcompetition that we see between
two national bank credit card systems,BankAmericard and Master Charge.
The president of BankAmericard has stressed thatsuch competition is
worthwhile and works, and that systems costs are quitemanageable.
Shortly, BankAmericard will start using a nationwide electronicclearance
system to process 200 million credit card items per year."The entire
system...costs less than $7 million, including central computers,90
mini-computer-type transmission units used in member centers,central
software, edit software for member banks, audit procedures,training and
operating manual and customer educational materials."5This system will cut
existing unit costs over 70 percent. It offers arelevant message for the
securities industry, which ought to have central processorswith higher
volume and potentially lower unit costs.
Ihappen to think that an open, free-flowing central market systemis
something that regional exchange members ought towelcome. With
quotations from all markets, transactions possible onall markets, and full
reporting, others need not operate in the shadowof New York. The Pacific
or Midwest member brokershould have the same information and the
same opportunity to seek best execution,and the same opportunity to get paid
for doing a better job. Such competition shouldreduce costs and brokerage
rates, and thereby increase tradingand liquidity. It is a game the skilled and
energetic should welcome (and of course it is a gamethose who lack these
skills should think of getting out of!).
The future of the industry lies very much with thoseof you in it. Even in
Washington, we are coming to realize the importanceof the point made
clearly by Donald Weeden, namely, that "competitionand innovation are
more important to thisover-structured industry than any proposed new
legislation or regulation."6 We cannot legislate ororder innovation and
competition. We can, however, legislate and order theelimination of legal
and self-regulatory barriers to these values.
I could not as a lawyer and a law enforcer underscore moreforcefully
the point that Phil Loomis just made a moment agoabout the difficulty of
ordering people to do something they don't want todo. There is a classic
case in the equity jurisprudencedealing with an opera singer in the
nineteenth century who broke her contract with the plaintiffand left him
square in London. He went in andsaid, "Make her sing;" and the chancellor
said, "I can't make her sing. I'll order her not to sing for anyoneelse, but I
won't order her to sing here." We have this continuingproblem, particularly
with the obligation to make orderly markets. I think, from alegal standpoint,
we have to go to designing systemsthat work more on the basis of carrots and
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less on thebasis of sticks.As one who spendshis time wieldingsticks, Iassure you there is frustrationoften enoughto affect you. At themoment, thereseems to be a broad
consensus amongthe commission, theexecutive branch,and theCongress on thisimmediate issue. This isa consensus infavor of competition.It is reflectedin the House andSenate securitiesstudies;1 in theSecurities andExchange Commission's releasesofi central marketsystem and fixedrate issues;8in the Treasurypaper on the futureof capitalmarkets; andin theJustice Department filingand testimony)°This is encouragingandimportant especiallyas a message forthose whorevere the past anddream that Mayday willnever come in 1975.
The commissiondeserves specialpraise for theway it has pressedon firmly, despitemany terrifyingscreams from thosewhom it regulates.This performance isparticularly visiblebecause itcomes at a time ofclear (and justified) public
dissatisfaction withthe waymany federalregulators have performed inthe past. Thenub of thatpublic criticismis that the regulators tendto listen toomuch to thosewhom theyregulate andnot enough toindependent andconsumer voices,and that,as a result, regulation tendsto becomea vehicle forsuppressingcompetition and protecting vestedinterests. Hap}.,,
C escapes thatcriticism, and indeed is heldup as a modelof viguiuusand independentregulation. One has onlyto contrasta couple ofnewspaper headlinesof thepast
couple ofmonths. Onefrom the WallStreet Journal,August 13,1974,
reads, "FriendlywatchdogCABis EnthusiasticBacker inMoves to Trim Airline Service,Increase Fares."Icontrast thatwith onefrom the
WashingtonPost, October20, 1974,which reads,"SEC Marks40th
Birthday withIndustry ItsBiggest Critic."I guess themessage is there.If
you do not havethe JusticeDepartmentcriticizingyou the industrywill
step into thegap.
Currentsuccess, admirableas it is, shouldnot blindus to long-term realitiesas we puttogetherlegislationdesigned forthe longterm. The
long-term realityis thatregulatorydecisions willbe ablefrequently (butnot
always) toexercisevery considerableinfluenceover theappointment
process, and howthe wholescheme works.hIThis hasoften beentrue of
the SEC inthe past.Faced witha dominantand determined
adversary, the
commission hasrarely usedits formalstatutorypowers oneconomic
questions,preferringinsteada process ofinformalbargaining andcom-
promise.12 Thisin partexplains whythe historic
restrictions haveheld on
for so long.
In thefuture,we can often
expect to havea commissionfar less
independent,determined,andinnovative thanthe onewe have att'e
moment. Thisis just what
one might calla political lawofaverages. Itmay
be goodnews for partsof theindustry, butpoor news forthe public.Views from Washington 275
What this means is that we should be very chary about handing the SEC
"blank check" grants of statutory power over competitive questions. The
commission should have the full and complete power necessary to tear
down the old barriers to competition (such as fixed rates and NYSE Rule
394),13 It should not be given broad powers to resurrect those barriers or
similar ones at some unspecified time in the future. Itis easy to say that
"the present commission would never do anything like that." This is not
the point. With the power present, some future commission might do
soand the presence of broad SEC powers to suppress future competition
will tend to invite future political efforts to secure appointment of commis-
sioners who will exercise those powers. Unfortunately, the presently
pending bills (particularly H.R. 5050) do contain just this type of open-
ended grant of authority to the SEC on key competitive questions
including resurrection of fixed rates and suppression of the third market.4
The Department of justice has opposed these particular provisions,15 but
they have so far survived the cut and thrust of legislative compromise.
What makes the legislation still highly worthwhile, despite these com-
promises, are the provisions on the central market system. H.R. 5050 gives
the SEC an even stronger basis for resisting the claims of "proprietary right"
over data necessary to the system. By eliminating this barrier, the legisla-
tion goes far toward assuring that we will have a fully open and fair central
market system, free of special preferences and protections. Such a competi-
tive and innovative environment may be expected to produce great for-
ward momentum for lower costs and far greater diversity in how the public
is served. Once the program has started rolling,it may make change
irreversible, and thus the ancient barriers and battles may be left far in the
past, where they belong.
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ROWEN: In thebeginning, therewasH.R. 5050. H.R.5050 is the resultof a study conductedin the Ninety-second
Congress by theSubcommitteeon Commerce andFinance. That study,in turn,grows out of thepassage of the SIPC [SecuritiesInvestor Protection
Corporation] legislationin 1970. The legislationnow has passed the
subcommittee, has beenreported by I hefull committee, and isawaiting a rule togo to the floor of theHouse for action; then to conferencewith the Senate.The Senate haspassed three billswhich, taken together,pretty much parallelH.R. 5050. As you mightexpect, thereare those in thesecurities industrywho are opposing the bill.They are attemptingto throw a little sandin thegears of the machinery to slowthings downlust enoughso that time willrun out before the Congress expiresjanuary 3. Myown best estimateis that theyare not going to be successfulin this endeavor,hut I think thenext six weekswill proveto
be veryinteresting.
In additionto the three billsI mentionedthenumbers ifyou are interested are S. 470, S.2058, and S.2519the Senatealso has passeda bill, S. 2474, providing forregulation ofmunicipal bonddealers. Thereis no comparable legislation inthe House of
Representatives. Inaddition, bothhouses have pending beforethem billsthat requireinstitutionalinvestors todisclose publicly andto the SECon a periodicbasis theirsecurities holdingsand transactions undercertain specified
circumstances. Thegoal is to takeall of
this legislation,wrap it up intoone bill duringconference,pass it, and then
send it ontothe Presidentforenactment. Whatthe final billwill look like,of
course, dependsa great dealan what theprincipals, thatis thesenators and
thecongressmen whoare on theconferencecommittee, decideabout areas
of disagreement.
Let me giveyou an idea ofwhat I thinkwill beincluded in thebill andV
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then touch on areas where there still are decisions to be made. Ibelieve
the final bill will contain a statutory provision eliminating fixed rates as of
May 1, 1975, but will give the Securities and Exchange Commission some
degree of flexibility to adjust that date lithe commission feels it in the
public interest to do so. That is one of the provisions that Don Baker of the
Department of Justice is less than delighted with, hut I think it will stay in
the bill as it comes out of the conference committee. The bill,I think, also
will contain a provision, found in slightly different forms in House and
Senate versions, prohibiting exchange members from transacting any busi-
ness with an affiliated personthe so-called 100-0 test.There will be certain
enumerated exceptions and exemptions to that test which are too compli-
cated to get into now. Basically, that test will replace the SEC's current 80-20
rule mandated by their Rule 1 9b-2 under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.
The 100-0 test, as a practical matter, should eliminate most institutional
membership from stock exchanges. Institutions have joined in the past as a
method of recapturing fixed commissions by having affiliated brokers do
portions of their own business for them. This will prohibit that. To me it
appears a rather cumbersome method of eliminatinginstitutional member-
ship, as I think the elimination of fixed rates will, for all intents and purposes,
remove the principal incentive for institutions to seeksuch memberships. For
some reason I still cannot understand, the industry wantsthat provision in the
bill, and lthinkwe probably will see it enacted. The bills will also give the SEC
clear authority to facilitate the creation of a national market system. It will give
the commission authority to implement theconsolidated transaction tape and
composite quotation system, both of which you will hear about in much
greater detail as the symposium progresses.
Let me only say now that we believe the commission already has the
authority to do what they are doing, but that legislation will make this point
absolutely clear.Ithink the bill also will contain some version of the
institutional disclosure acts that now are pending in the House and Senate.
Again, there are differences as far as cutoff limits, numbers, and things ofthat
sort; but I think we will work out a reasonable compromise.
There are areas where disagreement remains and where itstillis not
clear how the principals will resolve the differences. The one that seems to
be the current game in town is "paying up" for research. Both the House
and the Senate have provisions which say, in effect, that a fiduciary money
manager will not breach his fiduciary obligation by paying something more
than the cheapest commission then being charged in the securities indus-
try. The House believes that this clearly already is the law and should
remain so; that the fiduciary has a duty to choose a broker he thinks can
perform a valuable service for his beneficiaries and pay him a reasonable
fee for those services, even though there may be another broker down the
street who charges less. The Senate has a provision that does not go quiteL
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that far. Howthese twoprovisions will be ironedout in ronierenreis too difficult to foreseeright now.
HR. 5050 alsou)i)tdins a provisiondirecting the SECto conducta study of the activitiesof banks in thesecurities industry, aridnext year toreport to the Congress theirfindings, conclusions,and anyrecommendationsfor legislation thatmay emerge from thestudy. The securitiesindustry has been troubledfor some time bythe growinginvolvement of banksin their industry. Theindustry would likethe SEC and theHouse Commerce Committee, I think,to become involvedin this, not trustingthe committees of Congress thathave jurisdictionover banks, whichmay be leSs bothered by this intrusion.Senator WilliamslHarrison A. WilliamsJr., New JerseyJ has announcedthat the SenateSecurities Subcommitteeof the Senate Banking Committeewill conduct thatkind of a studyin the nextCongress. We are notsure how he views thisprovision in HR.5050whether he views it as anintrusion upon hisannounced studyor whether he iswilling to do his studyin conjunctionwith the SEC.We have notgotten a reading on that yet,so it is a little earlyto say whetheror not that provisionwill stay in the finalbill.
There also isa provision in bothH.R. 5050 andin S. 2519 thatwould give thecommission authority,under certainspecifiedcircumstances,to limit trading ofsecurities to exchange
markets. This isthe provisionwith which I believethe Departmentof Justice ismost unhappy;since this provisionappears in bothSenate and Housebills, however,I'd expect some form of it toemerge from theconference. Exactlywhat form itwill take, again, isnot now clear;they are castin somewhatdifferentways. H.R. 5050 alsoeliminates, bystatute, New YorkStock ExchangeRule 394. That rule, we believe,makes it virtually
impossible fora member totake a customer's trade offthe exchangefor execution,even if doingso would provide thecustomer a betterexecution. TheSenate bill doesnot contain comparable language.Again, we willhave to awaitthe conferenceto see
how thismatter is resolved.
Finally,as I mentioned,
the Senatehas passeda bill regulating
municipal
bond dealers.The Housenot only doesnot have acomparable bill,but has
held no hearingsin thisarea. The Senatewould liketo see that bill incorporated intothe finalconferencedocument. TheHouse traditionally
has beenreluctant to dothat whereit has heldno hearings andhas no
record of itsown on whichto accept theSenate bill. Onthe otherhand,
the SEC feelsthat provisionto be importantto the publicinterest, pointing
out recentabuses in thearea. Again, Ithink thismatter will haveto await
resolution inconference.
Assuming thatall thesematters arepassed betweennow and January3
and thePresident signsthe bill,and weexpect him todo so sincethe
Administrationis supportingthe bill ratherstrongly, Imight justgive yousome brief insight intowhat will be cooking in theNinety-fourth Congress.
We need something to dobetween (lie time that H.R. 5050 passesand the
time that l.nuis L.oss andhis committee send us theircomprehensive
recodification of the federal securitieslaws. What we had hoped todo this
year, and never got achance to do, was to take alook at specific
legislation. I see Mr. Wedbush[Edward W. Wedbushl is here. His firmhas
been very active in trying to obtainincreased SIPC coverage, particularly
for regional brokerage firms. Oneof the recommendations of SIPC,in a
report issued a few months ago, wasto increase coverage ofSIPC insur-
ance. This maytake care of Wedbush, Noble'sproblem; and,Ithink,
assuming 5050 passes, thatwill he the first area to which wewill turn
during the next Congress. Mr. Moss[Hon. John E. Mossi also hasindicated
an interest in taking alook at the Investment Advisers Act,in light of his
belief that when investors do return tothe marketplace, and he thinksthat
will happen some day, they may verywell turn to professional managers
for help in their affairs andthat, perhaps, the InvestmentAdvisers Act
needs strengthening.
Finally, the Securities and ExchangeCommission has recently put out a
package on mutual fund distribution.Part of that packageindicated that
they will send to the Congressproposed legislation concerning Section22d
of the Investment Company Actof 1940, concerning retail pricemainte-
nance. We will, of course,be happy to receive thoseproposals, and
introduce them as a matter of courtesy.We will then take it up in some
detail, in due course. Those,Ithink, pretty well cover the specificsof
where we are. Tomorrow, Mr. Mosswill be here to talk about policyand
to answer any questions you mayhave. And of course, to the extentthat
you have questionstoday, I will he happy to be asresponsive as I can.
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DOWD: Iwould liketo directa questionto HarveyRowen. He
mentioned that,in hisopinion,one of the
provisions ofthe omnibusbill as
it emergesfrom theconferencecommittee mightbe aposition dealingwith
the fiduciary'srightor abilityto "payup" forresearch.I know the
commission hadan all-day
conference,includingmany segmentsof the
industry,whichcame tono conclusionas to whethera federalprovision
sould satisfy
nonfederallyregulatedfiduciaries.Do youhave anypersonal
opinions as tohow fara provisionin a billsuch as050 wouldcarry to,
say. a statebankor a
state-administeredpension fund? RO\VEN:Our billspeciticallypre-emptsstate lawon this subject.
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is an out dause which says, ii the states do not like this federal policy, they
may, by statute, reverse it and pass a law in that particular state which says
we cannot do this, we have to do it some other way. But the bill as drafted
does pre-empt state law to a considerable extent on this subject.
FEUERSTEIN: Harvey, on the same subject, one of the big issues of
debate at the SEC conference was whether it is appropriate to pay up on an
execution for account A to purchase research for the sole benefit of
account B. Does the House legislation deal with this question? The Senate
legislation,Iknow, specifically says that the paying up must be on
commissions for the same account that received the research.
ROWEN: No, the House legislation does not address the so-called
allocation question, but simply lays down a broad standard that a fiduciary
money manager has to use reasonable business judgment in paying
commissions to brokers and that a complaint does not state a cause of
action by merely alleging that a fiduciary paid more than he would have
had he used the broker down the block. The complaint must allege
something more.
FEUERSTEIN: Well, if the legislation does not deal with that question, it
is almost totally worthless. I think most astute trust lawyers would tell you
that they have no problem in paying up for research, if the research is in
fact going to the account for which the excess commission is charged. The
only real problem is the interaccount problem.
ROWEN: That is not what we are hearing, Don. Jon Lovelace and I were
talking about this during the break, and maybe "paying up" is not a good
way of phrasing it. Jon was talking about the question of whether you have
to "pay down." If everyone got to a certain level, and if there are some
brokers who are below that level, do you have to choose one of the
cheaper brokers?Ithink maybe it is a semantic problem.I think all the
House is trying to do is lay down a broad principle. The specific fact
situations are for the courts. If you "pay up" for a trip to the Superbowl,
that is one set of facts; if you "pay up" for a broad economic report on a
situation in Zambia, and you happen to have a portfolio company that is
affected by circumstances in Zambia, that is something else again. Phil was
trying to make that distinction at the conferencetrying to talk about
different types of research product.
BAKER: Then you basically have three situations,I take it. You have a
situation where the research you are getting benefits entirely and exclu-
sively the account which the brokerage is going on. Second, which must
be the overwhelmingly common one, is thatit benefits the manager's
accounts generally. The third one benefits exclusively other accounts, but
not this one.It would seem to me to be highly undesirable, from the
standpoint of public policy regarding fiduciaries, to say to the broker,
"You can do it," in the third case. The second case is fine.282 Philip A. toomisfr, Donald I.Baker, HarveyA. Row
LOOMIS: I think thesecond case is probablythe mostcommon One, particularly forsome institutions. Many otthem tell us theydo not lookfor the brokersto tell them to buyX rather than Y. Thatis their job. Theywant more generalizedinformation.
GROSE: I would liketo put Mr. Loomison the spot about hisviews on the future ofthe SEC. Wouldyou like to address yourselfto Don Baker's expressions ofconcern as to whether theproposed legislationwould give too much statutorydiscretion toa regulatory body? LOOMIS: I understandhis concern, butit seems tome that itis the essence of theadministrativeprocess to giveadministrativeagencies authority to dealwith problemsas they arise, subjectto judicialreview. The Housecommittee in particularwas very carefulto make sure thatthe courts could takea look at anythingwe do. Some proposalsfor legislation would havegiven to us authoritythat I don't thinkwe should have,but as the legislationhas emerged, Idon't think it hasdone so. GROSE: Areyou speaking specificallyof the third-market
provision in one of its earlierphases?
LOOMIS: Yes,we were opposedto that.I mustsay, as I shouldhave done in my earlierremarks, thateverything here isjust my opinionand not that of thecommission, particularlyon this topic,on which wemay not be entirely unanimous.
WEEDEN: Yes, Iwondered if PhilLoomis would speakto the pointDon Baker madeconcerning clearingsystemsthe ideathat you leaveopen the possibility forcompeting systemsto develop, basedon the experiencethat innovations havecame principally fromclearing systemsin regionsoutside New York.
LOOMIS: Myinclination, atleast at theoutset, is thatwe should encourage the creationof more thanone system orcompetingsystems if, and this isan important if,thearrangements aresuch thata complete interface ispracticable betweenthe systems,that you donot haveany closed situationswhere a brokerhas to bea member oftwo or more differentsystems. That wouldbe unfortunate.Subject toadequate inter-
face,I would liketo seesome differentsystems.Ihave heardfrom proponents ofone or another
system advocatingthat their ideasare better
than the otherfellow's idea:it will becheaper, it willwork better.I am not
in a goodposition to makesure that that isso, but I thinkwe should havea
chance totry them inpracticeif wecan avoidcreating operational problems intheprocess.
BAKER: WhatI wasconcernedabout inparticularwas a time dimen- sion, withchanges intechnology. Atsome pointcompetitionmay become
feasible whichwas not possible
before. Wehave anoutstanding example
in theSatellite StatutewhichCongress passedin 1962, basedon an









which would be a natural monopoly. Within two years a fundamentally
different system employing stationary satellites had been developed. Such
a system did not constitute a natural monopoly; yet we had a statutethat
had been completely drafted in terms of natural monopoly assumptions.
I
have been concerned that even if we found there was a natural monopoly
now, that we not legally lock ourselves into it for all time.
PAINTER: I would like to pursue a dimension of Commissioner Loomis's
previous remark and ask that he extend his observations to the desirability
of competing systems for the composite quotation network, or should there
be only one composite quotation system?
LOOMIS: Well, my inclination there, and I probably will be enlightened
this afternoon, would be for a single basic quotation system. For example,
NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quota-
tion System)issingle; we do not have the two NASDAQs; various
organizations are free to plug into that and to provide subscribers with that
data in any form or combination the subscribers want.
WEEDEN: Essentially, what Bill IPainterl asked was to take that concept
and apply it to the central market system. Does the SEC think that it can
design a central market system that is so accommodating of potential
improvements and future requirements that they are willing to insist that it
be the only system through which all transactions have to take place?
LOOMIS:I would hope not.
RATNFR: I am going to try to focus on what the different roles of the
exchanges are when we talk about the role of regional stock exchanges in
a central market system. It seems to me, you have exchanges as theyhave
developed, performing several different functions. One is to provide an
actual facility through which orders meet and transactions are executed.I
suppose one question that comes up, that was just raised, is, What part of
this function is a natural monopoly? In other words, in what parts of that
process isit desirable to have a single system which probably has to be
regulated in one way, and what parts of it can you open up to competition?
In a way, 1suppose,itis similar to American Telephone and Telegraph.
Even if you assume the necessity, or the desirability, of a single communi-
cations network, it does not mean you must have a monopoly of people
making telephone equipment or of those who can transport equipment to it
in the end. The problem with exchanges as they had developed has been
that they have attached to the market facility a whole series of restrictions
on the retail end of their members' business. This aspect of the exchange,
as a rule-making entity governing the activities of its members, which is not
necessarily tied into the operation of an exchange facility, leads to situa-
tions where different people have different rules. Obviously the regional
exchanges have grown a lot in recent years because their rules were less
restrictive than those of New York, people could do business and gain an
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amount of access therethat they could notin New York. Ifthe SECcarries through in eliminatingfixed rates, and the billeliminating Rule394 other restrictionsalso is enacted, doesany role remain for the
regional exchanges as markettacilities?In other words, whenwe talk about exchanges or the roleof exchanges, whatfunctions of theexchangeare we discussing? Unlessyou separate them, it isvery hard to focuson them. FARRAR: Thatappears to be a statementas well as a question,
directed to me, perhaps,as appropriately ato any member of thepanel. Letme respond, therefore,by stating that inconsidering thefuture ofstock exchanges, and thefuture of regional stockexchanges in particular,we are focusing in thesymposium principallyon their future asfacilities forthe execution of transactions,or for providingaccess to a broader
marketplace in which trades willbe executed, ratherthan on theirfuture asrule- making bodiesor as agencies forenforcing rules laiddown byothers. BAKER: I just wantedto piggyback on DaveRatner's pointabout the telephone system.It seems tome that as we sit andthink aboutcentral institutions in the market,quotations, andso forth, they soundlike utilities. In fact, whatwe have is somethingthat is goingto use the existingutility, namely, the telephonesystem. Really whatyou have in any kindof central market schemeor in a central electronic
banking systemis two elements. One is a sort of
transportation systemand the otheris theinstitutional arrangement whichuses the transportationsystem. Youmay have a natural monopoly in thetransportation systemwithout havinga natural monopoly regarding theinstitutions thatuse it. BankArnericard
and MasterCharge are rather goodillustrations of thispoint.
MENDELSON: letme note two things.First, it is notclear tome that you can separate theproblem of theregionals asself-regulatoryorganizations and as tradingarenas. It is primarilybecause theyare tradingarenas that they have themembership theyhave andconsequentlycan impose regulations. Ifyou developa system in whichbrokers no longerhave reason to belongto a regionalstock exchangefor tradingpurposes, it is not clear that theyare going to belongat all. Sometechnologicaladvantages may develop, butthat remainsto be seen. Second is thequestion ofcompetition ina central marketsystem. I want to considersituations in whichwe have automated
executions. Itseems to me that what theSEC is thinkingabout isa set of regional
exchanges. each
of whichacts as a focalpoint for thetrading of itsown members. These regionais are allto be linkedto some centralbook so thatwhen an order comes into thesystem, somehowor other,an automaticrouting system decides whichof the marketsis best forthat particularorder and directsit
accordingly.An alternativeis the kindthat I hadsuggested, inhich we
have amonolithic centralbook andeverythinggoes directly to thatbook.
In that kindof system.I cansee absolutelyno function fora regionalI
exchange, or any other kind ofexchange. The objection to thisconcept is
that it may lead totechnological retardation. Onceyou have set the system
in operation, you havea complete monopoly. There is, however,a third
kind of system that mightyet work. What is important in settingup a
central market is that the marketfor any single stock should becentral
that there be a single focalpoint at which all orders for that stockcome
together, so that the best bid willmeet the best offer. If you try toset up a
system for all the stockson the New York Stock Exchange,you are going to
need a complex ofcomputers. Since that is thecase, there is no reason
why you can not divide themarket up and haveone processor bid to make the market forone quarter of the stocks, anotherprocessor bid for another
quarter of the stocks, andso forth. You have parallel central market
systems for different groups of stocks.Competition between the systems
may very well keep the technologyup to date.
GLAUBER: I would like to directa question to Mr. Loomis. You have
suggested that much of the growthof regional exchanges untilnow has
been based on their abilityto provide mechanisms for avoiding theimpact
of fixed minimum commissions.Quite obviously, the future growthof these
exchanges in an environment ofnegotiated rates will dependon their
ability to provide real servicesfor which brokers andinvestors are willing
to pay. What services doyou think regional exchangescan uniquely
provide?
LOOMIS: Well, I do not knowexactly what they would be, but I havea
number of ideas in mind.Regional exchanges in thepast have devised
systems for handling orders, handlingback-office procedures whichwere different, and insome degree better, than those that existed elsewhere,and
they have gained by doing that.There is, of course,a basic problem as far
as the situation that will arise when fixedrates are eliminated. Heretofore,
the industry has functionedon a basis in which the only thing that anybody
gets paid for is executinga transaction. That has become increasingly less
satisfactory as it has become, interms of costs and other things,a smaller
component of the entire service package.
Iwould think the regional
exchanges and others might devisepackages of service for investors and
means of paying for them which mightprovide needed innovation in that
area.
SHELTON: I would like to raisea question that links to Mr. Loomis's
answer. So much of the discussion in thepapers and across the conference
table seems to have focusedon the issue of the competitive viability of
regional exchanges ina world of negotiated commissions, consolidated
tapes, and unrestrained third-marketactivity.It seems as though this
discussion assumes thereare no externalities to be considered when
evaluating the regional stockmarkets. That is to say, if theregionals can't













ePhill;) A.OUIfli'.ft.1)on,ikl1.Raker,F larv( 286
hear CommissIoner t.00riiis's view on svhe;her he thinks
therear. external economies associated with regional t'X(hdngps
that migFn them worth sustaining even if they prove not It) he
economicallyviable 'isolated proft centers.'' In this regard, I am thinking
QSpe ially ofIhre; that regional exchanges may till by providing a broader
more liquid
,, more visible market for the stocks ot smallregionalcml)anjesif th regional exchanges die out, will small firmsencoLinter increaseddiffj raising equity capital in the future?
LOOMIS: Yes,Itouched on that in my remark
SHELTON: But you did not touch Ofl youranswer to it, andthat is was worried about.
LOOMIS: The reasonI did not is that weare talking about
a flàtiona, market system which is designed forsecurities of national
interest Th regionals will, of course, contine to providemarkets forregionalsecurities GtJERIN: I am just curious. YOUare talking about theelimination01394 and the elimination of fixed rates.We are now ina negotiateçjra1. environment. Why should exchangesexist at all? Whyshouldanyth belong to an exchange? Isn't itjust a natural stamping
ground for trading firms and verylarge processors who thenestablish somevery lou wholesale rate for all the otherbig producers?
LOOMIS: I am not sure Igot the whole thrust of thequestion. Youseem to suggest that if fixed rates and394 go out, theincentives to exchange membership will disappear andvarious things might follow.Now that,to degree, is true. That is, thecommission rate and 34 havecreated barriers and enclaves, ifImay put it so, for particularbrokers andspecialist5 Under the new regime,I would suppose,customers' orders wouldflow to market centers offeringthe best quotations.In effect, it iscontemplatthat persons would be members ofa central market systemwhich wouldgive them access toany market center rather thanonly to a particularexchange That is a longway off, however. Initially,membership on exchangeswill exist. The MidwestStock Exchangeexpressed concern at thehearings Tuesday [November19, 19741 as to theexisting definition ofmembership, in terms ofcommission rates; howthat will work afterMay 1; and the necessity of getting thedefinition of member,as the term is used in the 5050 legislation,before that time.Iagree with that.Ithink that the exchange functionmay become more thatof providinga marketplace than Providing a satelliteSystem of brokers whoare able to go only to that marketplace.
GUERIN: HarveyIRowenl, if theinstitutional membershipquestion is eliminated whenyou go to negotiated
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ROWEN: Ithink, John, that people will continue to he exchange
members as tong as they feelitiseither to their advantage, to the
customer's advantage, or both for them to do so.itis going tu be an
economic decision made by the member firm. lithe exchange provides
some economic service to them by way of providing a good marketplace,
by way of providing clearance and settlement capabilities or any other
useful services, so that managers of the firms decide itis in their best
interest to belong, they will belong; and if they decide that it is not in their
interest to do so, then they will not belong.Ithink Congress has ap-
proached this thing as a problem, or an opportunity, to figure out a way or
mechanism of allowing public customers to try, and hopefully get, best
execution and best service. Just howwhether through the facility of
something called an exchange, or a black box, or a combination of the
twowe hope will emerge through a competitive process over time. We
believe that if the exchanges structure themselves in a way that is attractive
to member firms, such firms will continue to belong to them.
LOOMIS: I would like to comment on Professor Mendelson's question
on whether the commission is in favor of having orders directed to one
exchange or the other by a computer. We have not said that. We have not
proposed to take away from brokers the right to send their orders where
they please, so long as they do so, consistently, in search of best execution.
FEUERSTEIN: There seems to be in this discussion the implicit assump-
tion that it would not necessarily be a bad thing if fully negotiated rates
lead to exchange membership only by those people who are in fact
specialists in execution, i.e., dealers and floor brokers, with other members
of the securities industry using their services, but not being members of the
exchange. Of course, the only thing that is inherentri a central market
system is that all the orders in fact flow through that system.Itis not
inherent in the central market system that regulation of the retail activities
of the business also take place by exchanges. There is another seff-
regulatory body in existence in the United States that has jurisdiction over
virtually the entire securities industry, without regard to their membership
on exchanges, that could perform that function.
SERVETNICK: I would like to ask Mr. Baker if there are to be competing
market makers in the central market system?If one particular market
maker, because of his capital structure or individual skills in making the
market for a particular stock or group of stocks, becomes the dominant
market maker or sole market maker in that area, what would be your
attitude in the Justice Department of the evolutionary processes that led to
this result?
BAKER: The antitrust laws always have recognized that someone who
achieves a monopoly position solely by skill, foresight, and industry is
entitled to retain that monopoly position, so long as he does not indulge in
any anticornpetitive practices. If this were not the rule, antitrust would be// 288 Philip A. IMomiS Jr.. Donald1.Baker, HarveyA. Roweri
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penalizing SUCCeSS at doingwhat it seeks toencourage, namely,entre- preneurial initiative andhard work.
WEEDEN: Does Xeroxagree with you?
BAKER: I would hopeso. But they are in the midstof a Federal
Trade Commission monopolizationcase, and I wouldn't wantto commenton the evidence in it.
Going back to the originalquestion, I would find itvery differentto have a monopoly market makerbecause he has donea much moreefficient job over a period of time thananyone else was ableto doasopposed to having a monopoly marketmaker because the NYSEor the SEC said"there shall be only one."As long as other potentialmarket makersare legally free to enter andcompete with him themonopolist willnot be alonein the field for long ifhe does not continueto do a superiorjob. Thescale economies and entrybarriers are simplynot that high foran efficientnew entrant who wantsto challenge a decliningmonopolist. Thethird market experience is helpfulhere: that institutiongrew up and prospered
because t could do a better jobon a net basis than monopoly
specialists andexchange brokers often coulddo under the fixedcommission systemand variousother competitive restraints.In sum, myconcern is very definitelywith monopoly market making whichcomes about by legal fiator private restraint,rather than clearly superiorcompetitive skill ina fully competitive
environment. GLAUBER: Iguess I want to ask DonBaker, Doyou think this isa type of business thatis likely to leadto a monopolyposition, or doesit have the characteristics thatprevent entry?
BAKER: No, Idefinitely donot. I have simplybeen makingthe assump- tion that it mightoccur in order toanswer the priorquestion. In fact,I do not see anyreason why we shouldexpect to have marketmaking doneon a monopoly basis,or brokerage either.In fact marketmaking doesnot seem to be characterizedby suchpervasive economiesof scaleas to be subject to anythinglike "naturalmonopoly"characteristics. Asyou know, for over sixyears now the defendersof fixedbrokerage rateshave argued loudly that theirelimination wouldlead to "destructive
competition" and to a brokerage
industry dominatedby twoor three firms.However, they have entirelyfailed to makea case as amatter of economic
evidence, and I
just do notsee it happening
as a matter of fact.Thus, as longas we havea
system of entrybased onobjectivequalifications ratherthan subjective regulatoryor self-regulatory
judgments,we seemvery likely to have competition bothin brokerageand in marketmaking. WEEDEN: Ithink whereyou have theopportunity forsomeone to develop amonopoly of thatsort in othersecurities,government bonds,or municpal bonds,you have nothad amonopoly develop.I think the evidence is thatit wouldnot here, either.Now therewas that case where
the Street,as a monopolyat one timeback aboutten yearsago, decided
they wouldhave onlyone bid forState of California
bonds. Some fellowwith a computer came in and brokeup that monopoly. Unfortunately, he
went out of business shortly thereafter.
BAKER: There is a difference betweena monopoly and a cartel.
WEEDEN: My question may sound technical, but itis a fundamental
question in terms of the central market system, and it is the issue surround-
ing NYSE Rule 113.Ibring it up here because you have madea fairly
definitive statement, in your opinion, about 113 regarding the third market,
but have hedged a little bit in terms of its applicationto regional ex-
changes. I wondered if you would discuss thereasons for Rule 11 3, which
I am sure everybody knows is a prohibition on specialists being ableto
deal with insiders, corporate officers, or institutions directly, andact as
their broker. Could you discuss the reasons for that rule and whyyou think
113 should be applied to regional specialistseven if the central market
system no longer has those characteristics that brought us to it in the first
place?
LOOMIS: As I indicated briefly, at least in my remarks, the origin of that
type of rule was the Special Study, particularly the American Stock
Exchange part of the Special Study. We found that specialists who had
handled institutional accounts favored those accountsover the public in
various ways. The whole relationship was incestuous and insome in-
stances corrupt; but, of course, it evolved around the monopoly position of
the specialists. In the environment we had in 1963, the commission felt
strongly that that practice should be put to an end. Therewas considerable
discussion, at the time, whether one shouldgo further and provide that a
specialist cannot deal directly with any public investorsi.e.,cannot have
any customers except other brokers. That was not done for various reasons.
Now, of course, the third market. in its most important form,was created
specifically to provide investors, particularly institutional investors, witha
service they could not get elsewhere. They could not continue in business
if11 3 were applied to them. As to regional exchange specialists,I
specifically left that open because that is a matter that is being considered
in various circles at the present time. I did not want to indicatean answer
at this point. Personally,I am not so sure that Rule 113 should apply to
regional specialists, but I just do not want to takea position on that, now.
LEWIS: This is apropos of Rule 113. Two questions. One: Does 5050
address itself to 113 at all?
LOOMIS: Not to my knowledge.I do not think it has any specific
provision about that.
LEWIS: The second question is, What would your views be ifa New
York specialist firm joined the Pacific Stock Exchange because they liked
the stock? As a member of the Pacific, or any regional exchange, woulda
specialist have the best of all possible worlds? Would he be restricted from
dealing directly with institutions by Rule 113?
LOOMIS: Well, if Rule 113 survives, I presume provisions would not be
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established by whichit CoukI be evaded, ifthat is whatyou mean. Butas say, the future of Rule 11 3 aridthe central marketsystem just isnot settled yet.
GARMAN: I would liketo know a little bitmore about the
composite quotation system. We hearda lot about theimplementationStt'ps of the composite tape. Specifically,what is contemplatedby the SECas to whata composite quotationsystem will be? And second,what is itsstatus? LOOMIS: I think thecourse contemplatedor outlined (wedo nothave the details yet workedout) would bea quotations systemunder whichall qualified marketmakers (andqualifications stillare under
consideration) would be allowedto enter their quotations.I wouldsuspect thatwhiIe administrative, governing,and otheraspects of itmay well differ,the mechanicalproductmight welllook verymuchlikeNASDAQ supplemented byvarious interrogationsystems. We havea rule callingfor plans to be filed fora composite quotationsystem, but it isin theplanning stage now and isnot expected tocome into operationuntil nextJune. The exact timing isobscure, as othershave noted. TheNew YorkStock Exchange has indicateditbelieves it hasa proprietaryinterestinits quotations. Thelegislation wouldclarify that problem.The timing,I do not know. I thinkthe enactmentof the legislationwill affectthe timing. IRELAND: Mr. Baker,since the antitrustdivision hasbeen mosthelpful in rearrangingthe markets thisyear, did they havea plan in mindbefore they started? Didthey envisionwhat the marketwould looklike nextyear? BAKER: I thinkyou just pulledmy leg. I thinkone of the thingsabout the Antitrust Divisionis that weare very suspiciousaboutgovernment telling you how to doyour thing and howto structure it,So ourconcern has been more with getting ridof therestrictions thatprevent it frombeing donein other ways. Inorder to do thatconstructively,you at least haveto be able to go through the
intellectual exerciseof conceivingsomehow thatit could be done. I thinkif youwant to carry it thatfar, yes,we had sonicconcept.
But, if you thenask me thenext question,Did we havea conceptwe were sure was the rightone? theanswer would beno. You shouldnot go charging offdown themountain withoutany idea of whatis at thebottom,
I suppose; butI do not thinkthat it isour role eitherto dictateor to tell the SEC how to dictate,but, more often,tell themhow we thinkthey shouldnot
dictate.
One of thefundamentaldifferencesbetween theantitrust positionand a
lot ofregulators isthatmany regulatorshave, andexcludingpresent
company andpresent commissions,what I call thejampot mentality.That
is, they havea lot of peopleout there withslices of breadand the regulator sits there withhis pot ofjam. His jobis to decidehow muchjam goes on
various people'spieces of bread.Itis a somewhat
subjectiveprocess





















approach is to permit consumers in the market to decide how much jam
should go on various people's pieces of bread, and in our view the
government's role should be to make sure thatit works that way.
McQUOWN: Iamstuck back on some words that Mr. Loomis used
about the proposition of natural monopolies and statutory monopolies or
statutory law or natural law, which seenied perhaps to be the same thing. I
am interested in decomposing that assumption in the following way in an
effort to determine why regional exchanges exist. The assumption being I
think, economies of scale being the classical argument, that in both the law
and the economics of monopolies, if you want to exclude a favored
position by statute or otherwise, that economies of scale presumably would
dictate who ends up performing the functions of exchanging information
and transferring securities in the marketplace. Now my question arises out
of the following: Apart from the information exchange component, which
presumably is akin to Mr. Baker's comment regarding the transportation
systemthe phone lines are in place or the satellites existyou have some
interfaces that peopie can tap into either to provide or obtain information.
Once the price on that security has been established through the informa-
tion network, what is left seems to be the settlement process where relative
advantage and economies of scale might be argued. But when you
decompose the regional exchanges into their relative advantages regarding
information or settlement, it seems to me that with whatever communica-
tiouls network we have in place, itis hard for me to conclude that there is,
or can be, any relative advantage, any monopoly position, derived from
superior access to market information. Thus, whenIview a regional
exchange in a freer form, from a natural law, and there is no institutional
constraint regarding membership, however and whyever it was instituted, I
cannot see why anything but the settlement issue is open for discussion
regarding regional exchanges.
LOOMIS: In the first place, we may need to think about the type of things
we have now and are going to have in the near future. To predict the
ultimate outcome is difficult, as there is a little more than just information
involved in this process. There is also the process of the market maker who
usually makes decisions with respect to the orders that come to him and
visualizes the regional exchanges as having a place in that function. As to
monopoly, what I was referring to is the fact that, in the past, specialists on
the New York Stock Exchange had a practical monopoly of the market-
making function for the securities listed on that exchange. In the central
market system, thatis not the way it will be. There will be no legal
arrangement which creates a monopoly of market making in one person;
the field will be open to others. I do not think that in the foreseeable future
it will all become automatic, with market making being done by computer.
I do not say that that could not happen someday, but I probably will not
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live to see it.think there is a function,at least in part, to be
performed by the market maker.
PAINTER: Mr. Loomis, isn'tit just as possible, however,that sincethe system of dual specialistson the New York StockExchangeevolved through the passage of timeinto a single specialistin a givenstock, might also do so ina central market system. Althoughthere mightfirst be competing specialists, with theregional exchanges andso on competing with New York, mightwe not once again have thesame processtake place; and tenyears from now see that justone specialist hasemerged in IBM on the national marketsystem?
LOOMIS: That is conceivable.However, the special
conditions that eroded competitionbetween specialistson the New York Stock
Exchange will not necessarily bepresent in the central marketsystem. Insome way it is very difficult fortwo people to competeactively whenthey aresitting side by side someplaceand each knows exactlywhat the otheris doing or thinking. What you describedmight ultimatelyevolve. Iam inclinedto think it will not,however.
PAINTER: May I ask,aren't you perhapsconcentrating toomuch on the importance of physicalproximity and neglectingthe fact thatthere will be electronic proximitybetween specialistsin the nationalmarket system;and in a sense they willbe very much,even more so, cheekby jowleven though theyare separated by threethousand miles?
LOOMIS: Well, in theNASDAQ system thereis electronicproximity but there has notbeen a gravitationthere to onlyone market makerin securities ofany importance. It is onlyin the ones thatnobody isinterested in that youget only one marketmaker.
BAKER: I sayas an antitrust lawyer,I drawsome distinctionbetween cheek by jowlproximity and electronicproximity. Thereason is, if youare all sitting aroundin a quasi-social
environment thereare a lot more pressures on you notto compete than ifyou are sellingto a guy you donot even know who isway off at the end ofthe line. WEST: I would liketo make a quickobservation. Isn'tit fair tosay that the eliminationof competitionbetween specialistson the exchangewas not the result ofa naturalprocess, but in factresulted fromagreement between specialistsnot to competewith each other? I would liketo ask you thefollowing question.I think I understoodyour answer to thequestion posedearlier aboutthe regionalexchange. Letme rephrase it though,and askyou the question ina slightly differentway. If I understand whatyou are saying,you could seea need and a role forthe market makerson regionalexchanges if theyare good marketmakers. What role isthere for theexchangeseparate from itsmarket makers, ifany? LOOMIS: The roleof the exchangeis to providea framework within which marketmakers for thevarious securitiesoperate. SomebodywillViews from Washington 293
have to 'run" the market. They do not seem to run themselves. Some of
the things that Don Baker suggested may happen if they do. Then, of
course, the government of the central market system has not yet been
settled, There will be some rules which will be systemwide and some
which will not be systemwide. The local rules probably will be made by
local exchanges.
WEEDEN: Iview our firm,in a sense, as an exchange where our
management, which is similar in some respects to that of an exchange, has
allocated responsibility to various people to make markets. We have, in
effect, assigned market-making responsibility to eight separate guys. We
have a form of compensation and a relationship between management and
market makers that is different from that on an exchange. I think that in the
open marketplace, an exchange is simply another vehicle for bringing a lot
of market makers together, but in a looser form, where each one of them is
an individual entrepreneur who has his own capital and makes his own
decisions. The exchange does perform certain supervisory, management,
or oversight functions, and provides sufficient communications for those
people to assist them to attract inquiry from whatever regional or national
areas they want to attract it from; hut they assign people to stocks just as
we do. So if you go to an open market,I do not think it means that
everything has to go upstairs.Ithink that the physical proximity that we
have and that the Pacific Stock Exchange has, but in this looser, more
independent way, and the operating functions the exchanges provide, will
survive if they (the exchanges] have competitive communications, com-
petitive access, and competitive market making.
Now my question.
I do not know how you fit it into a seminar on regional exchanges, but I
am sure we all would like to know what the reaction of each of you is to
the Supreme Court decision to take up Cordon v. New York Stock
Exchangefrom your particular point of viewand what your initial
position will be, if that is possible. I would think that all of you would have
some kind of answer.
BAKER: Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange involved a private antitrust
suit challenging fixed commission rates. The SEC filed an amicus brief
urging the Supreme Court to take it. The New York Stock Exchange, which
won below in the Second Circuit, took the unusual step of also urging that
the Supreme Court take it; and, of course, the plaintiff didwhich might
suggest thatit was not the Antitrust Division's choicest vehicle.
We have another case raising the same issue called Thil! Securities v.
New York Stock Exchange which has been fully tried and is awaiting, for a
year and a half now, decision by a district judge in Wisconsin. The issue,
in the narrow sense and in Gordon, is whether when you have exchange
rules (in this case fixing rates) that have been approved by the SEC, or have294
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been allowedto go on by theSEC, and thatare within theSEC'sarea o responsibibty underSection 19 andsome otherprovisions of the
statute
those rulesare then exempttrom antitrustliability. Therehas beena loud
and continuingbattle over theproper principlesthat shouldbeapplierl
there, and theAntitrust Division'sview is quitedifferent fromtheSecond
Circuit's. Theargument is,you want a processof very careful
accommorla.
lion between theantitrust laws andthe securitieslaws.Basically,whatwe
want is a themesuch as thatapplied by thecourt in theThillcase, namely,
when you havean exchange nilethat is approvedby theSEC orallowedto
go ahead, theantitrust courtfirst of all askswhether thatrulewould
normally, ifpracticed inan unregulated
environment, violatetheantitrust
laws? If theanswer is yes, thentI,e nextquestion is, Isitnecessary tothe
exchange schemeof regulation.in thesense that it makesthis thingwork
and that thesame goals couldnot Le achievedin a less
anticompetstjs'e
way? We havealways said thatthe anti trustcourts shouldthen askthe SEC
what it thinksabout thatsubject. TheSEC tendsto feel that
this reducesit
to what Iremember PhilLoomis oncecalled anamicus role. There aresome very difficultproblems in thisarea. The Second
Circuit
pointed out thatexchanges havea mandateo dutyofscif-regulation.You
do havean issue of therisk involvedif they calithe v rongshot, Willthey
be subjectto antitrustliability andtreble damages?Won't thathavea
chilling effecton their self-regulatory
responsibilities?We have
recognized
this asan importantissue. Ina way, thereis a specialproblembecause of
the magnitudeof damagesin theseprivatecases: I made
no secret ofthe
obvious factthat theDepartment ofJustice's principalinterest is inequi-
tableprospective reliefand to besure that thecompetitiveprinciplesoper-
ate to thefullest extentpossible. Thechilling effecton self-regulationis
obviouslymost extremewhen youhave damages,and treble
damages to
boot. Thedepartmentsuggested inone of its briefs,in the Thillcase, that
retrospectivedamages neednot followfrom afinding ofliability. These
may be somewhat
separate issues.
Anyway, wherewe are going,it seemsto me, ispretty clear.I expect
that boththe Securitiesand Exchange
Commissionand thesolicitor general
will file briefsin theSupreme Courton this question,
although itis possible
that thesolicitor generalwill fileonlyone brief.I doubtthat theSEC's
interest isgoing togo away fromCircuitstage to thefull briefingstage; and
I doubtthe AntitrustDivision'sinterest, aftersix years,is goingto go away
either. Thelast timethis issuecame upwas in acase called Silverv. New
York StockExchange,which isthe landmarkcase on thesubject In that
case, the solicitor
general fileda brief whichhad thesignatures ofneither
the generalcounsel ofthe SECnor theassistantattorney generalfor
Antitrust. Hewas off onwhat might
retrospectivelybe regardedas a frolic
of hisown. Thebriefingschedulesare, ifIiecallcorrectly, thattheI
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ea of appellate's brief, which is thefirst brief up, is due the firstweek of January,
tute, and an amicus brief supportingthe appellate must befiled at the same
loud time; a supporting amicusbrief, supporting the exchange,would be due
lied forty-five days later.Itis a very important case,although it conceivably
ond could become moot as aresult of 5050.
oda. ROWEN: In our Study ofSecurities Markets in 1972 wedevote one
we chapter to this question. \41e startwith the Silver case andanalyze that and
ely, its progeny. The subcommitteetHouse Subcommittee OflCommerce and
d to Finance] came to much the sameconclusion as the JusticeDepartment-
ould that antitrust laws do play arole. The Senate SecuritiesSubcommittee,
trust under Dave Ratner's leadership,went through the sameexercise and came
the out at the same place.So you have both oursubcommittees, plus the
york chairmen of the SenateAntitrust Subcommitteeand the House Judiciary
Committee, agreeing. Youhave Justice and at leastcertain parts of the
SEC Congress on one side,and the SEC and the securitiesindustry on the other
es j side. Obviously we are notgoing to play any role inthe Supreme Court
decision at all; but, like anyother decision in the SupremeCourt, or any
cuit court, the Congress isempowered to enact legislation inlight of a Court
ou
decision, if it feels there is aneed for legislation. I am sure weall will be
hey watching that case with a greatdeal of interest.
e a
LOOMIS: Don IBakerl hasexplained the problem in quite adispassion-
ed ate way. I suspectthe briefs will be a littledifferent. It is not our position,
of
and never has been, thatthe antitrust laws have nopart to play in the
the
sccurties field. They have,and they have often, as inSilver itself, had a
ui-
rather salutary effect; but itis partly a matter ofprocedure and partly a
er-
matter of philosophy. It is ourfeeling, for example, thatall these questions
we have beendiscussing today, and willcontinue to discuss, areinterre-
to
lated; that their supervisionrequires administrative judgmentsand adminis-
at
trative accommodationof a variety of considerations.We do not feel that
se
the right way to decidethis is to have a district courtin Wisconsin, or
somewhere else, lookingsolely at the question ofwhether there was or
ct
was not arestraint oncompetition_making a judgment on aparticular
ral
aspect of the situationwithout having before it, orhaving the authority or
perhdps the analytical resourcesto weigh, thewhole picture. The SEC
was created todo that in some areas. Donhas an intrinsic distrustof an
d
administrative agency's ability todo such things; but theseproblems are
not, in our view, subject topolicymaking by decision in onecourt on a
limited record, because they are sointerrelated.
at
BAKER: The thing thatis intriguing aboutthis particular case,coming
er
along at this particularmoment, of course, isthat it does not come inthe
or
same way that someof the great antitrust casesinvolving regulated
industries have comeinto the Departmentof Justice and the agencies.
There have been daggersdrawn on some of thoseoccasions. By and large,we agree with what theagency is doing at themoment.think ti differences of opinionbetween the commissionand the
Departmentof Justice currently havea slightly theoreticalquality aboutthembecausewe each are talking aboutthe longrun.
RICKERSHAUSLR First of all,I am going to askyou if you know
whether it will be argued andtherefore decidedby June,or will the
schedulepush it off another year?
BAKER: It soundsas though it will be arguedin April andhandeddown on the last day ofterm, which sometimesmeans a little bit
more hurried opinion thanones that are handeddown earlier.
RICKERSHAUSER Theother thing Iam raising my handforconcerns the regional exchangesand their survivaLIreally cannotanswer
questions about the viabilityof regional exchangesin the abstract.It seemsto me that you have to talk aboutthe mechanicsof how thecentral marketwill work at the timeyou ask the question.In the systemwe havenow, theretail broker sends hisorders toa particular marketplacefirst,executes thereif
he is satisfied heis getting thebest executionor, if not,
goes elsewhere and thissystem is distinguishedfrom openinga black boxwhere hecan see all the bids andoffers and getthere immediately.The exchangehas functions, other thanits tradingmechanism, whichmay offer
inducements
to a retail brokerto try there first;so when bids andoffers arejust as good in severalmarket centerswhich
occurs frequentlybrokerswill trya
particular marketfirst for otherreasons. Some ofthose otherfunctionsare
better clearing,better bookkeeping,etc. While DonWeedenmay be an exchange, or hisfirm may beone, he doesnot offer those
other functions which mayenable some ofthe regiorialsto competewith himand with the
New YorkStock Exchangeas well. Onecannotcompete solelyon
execution becauseon a stock suchas GeneralMotors,everybody'sis
going to be atthe same pricefor a hundredshares;you are notgoing to finda
big difference.
SMIDT: Somewhatrelated tothat point,a lot of the
questions have
suggested thatexchangesperform severalfunctions. Iwouldsuggest, first
of all, thatnot all of thesefunctionsare necessarilysubject in thesame
degree toeconomies ofscale. Second,not alleconomies ofscaleoccur at
this levelof a firm.In mostcities thereare areas whereyou find many
restaurants inone locationbecause ofexternaleconomies ofscale, butno
particularrestaurantsare subject toeconomies ofscale internally.I think
that thereis considerable
experience thatsuggests thatthere area lot of
externaleconomies ofscale withrespect tocertain kindsof financial
functions.Therefore, itoccurs to methat anexchange thatis concerned
with enlargingits marketmightconsiderwhether itwants to performsome
of thosefunctionsat a different
location thanothers. I wouldlike to aska question,and all thisis anintroductionto it, to any
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Harvey A.R'enor at! members of the panel. Are there any regulatory constraintsthat
would prevent an exchange from opening a branch in another city to
perform certain of its functions? Let me be more specific. Are there any
constraints that would prevent a regional exchange from performing cer-
tain of its functions in New York?
RICKERSHAUSER:I do not want them to say no.
LOOMIS: I will not say no then. The statutes do not say. We have had
experiences with exchanges in more than one place. The MidwestStock
Exchange has had various facilities around the Midwest. The Pacific Stock
Exchange operates in Los Angeles and in San Francisco. At one point the
American Stock Exchange, as I recall, was thinking of establishing a branch
office on the Pacific coast. There was, in some circles, less than enthusiasm
for that idea.I do not think there is any law against it, however.
FEUERSTEIN: There has been a lot of talk about the regional exchanges
being able to attract what you might call"first call" on execution by
offering superior services to its members that may be more or less related
to execution, such as clearance, bookkeeping, etc.I wonder if Don Baker
would like to comment on whether, if a regional exchange were able to
develop superior services but made itavailable only to people who
execute transactions on those exchanges, whether thatwould raise any
antitrust considerations?
BAKER: Well, I suspect you wouldn't have asked the question if youdid
not think that it raised an antitrust issue. There is a fundamental conceptin
antitrust law called the tie-in: this is where a seller of two related products
requires the buyer to buy one in order to get the other. Thetraditional
tie-in cases involved use of leased machinery and the suppliesused on it
(such as shoe manufacturing machinery and shoe materials orsalt-
dispensing machinery and salt). A tie-in generally is describedby the
courts as being illegal per sein other words, illegalwithout any actual
proof of harm to competition in the particular case. However, Ishould
caution you that the tie-in rules are filled with subtle wrinkles.First, it must
be clear that two products are involvedand this often can provequite
difficult to show. In the situation we are discussing herenamely, execu-
tion, clearance, and sellingthere would be a very serious argumentthat
they were in fact all parts of a single product and that the specific terms
simply described various aspects of it.If you got past that and said, "Yes,
they are separate products," and you had competitors for thetied products
alone who were being foreclosed to any meaningful degree,then the
antitrust laws probably would apply to the combination primafade. This
then would take you to the type of issue now pending in Cordon v.New
York Stock Exchange, namely, whether the "execution, clearance,and
selling" package was somehow exempted from the antitrust laws.Even
under our view of the issues in Cordon, such a scheme would belegal if it
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were necessary to make the ExchangeAct work. If whatyo areaboutto say is that it isn't necessary to makethe scheme ofregulationwork, hutit might be necessary for thecurvival of regionalexhanges,then
YOU have presented an interestingand novel question.
LEWIS: In a real-worldexecution, whether itis for thepublicor the institutionS, you can addup eight places aninstitution oran individual
can go today to have an order executed:the third market,Boston,
Philadelphia Midwest, New York, theCoast (north andsouth), or theupstairsmarket, which would bea position house suchas Goldman, Sachs,
Salomonetc. Going back to CommissionerLoomis's openingremark, I thinkwhat describing is a centralmarketplace. Isn't thereal problemaccess tothose markets, market making,and capital? Whatdoes it haveto dowith monopolies? Thoseexist rightnow. The central market
has existedto my knowledge since I havebeen in this end ofthe businessforthe lastten years. I wonder ifone of the panelists has
any views on that
observation Particularly, isn't itpossible that theguts of thematter areaccess and capital? Obviously,the specialistin Telephonein NewYork hasmore capital than thespecialist in Telephonein Boston.Because ofthese face their competitivepositions may beunequal, butthey stillare competing specialists.
LOOMIS: Yes,access is very important.
Broker-dealerstraditionally have, moreor less, had access onlyto an exchangeof whichtheywere a member. Toa degree that still istrue. Members ofthe New Yorkhave had such a largeproportion of theorders that,naturally, ruleswhich limited their ability to tradein other marketsoperated toconcentrate orderson the New York Exchange.The New Yorkfelt thatwas a very goodthing, andin some ways itwas. But under thecentral marketsystem, accesswill be much moreopen; and therefore,
competing marketmakers, andparticu- larly competingspecialists, hopefullywould havebetteraccess than they have had before.
Most anybody hashadaccess to the thirdmarket, butnot everybody coulduse it.I do seea muchmore opensystem. GLAUBER: I wouldlike to returnto an issue withwhich we began:the impact ofnegotiated rateson the way
institutions, particularlymutual
funds,pay for research.There isa scenario acceptedby a numberof people whichsuggests thatinstitutions willbe unableto afford toiay hard dollars forresearch, andbecause theywill fearlawsuits, will beunwilling
to negotiatehighercommissions topay for research.In this environment what mayemerge is a fewlarge, fullyintegrated firmswhich will give away a researchproductas part of theexecution serviceand absorb the research cost.Do you thinkthis is a likely
outcome, and ifyou do, is it one
worthencouraging?
LOOMIS: Werecently helda conferencewhich wasvisualized, at least











































brokers in a competitive environment,and what the institutionswould
expect and receive frombrokers. It dcvelopcdprimarily into a discussion
of paying up for research. Ithas been said that no decisionswere arrived at
at that conference, one reasonbeing that there was riointention to do so.
The purpose was to obtainideas and get broker-dealersand institutions to
sit down together insteadof in their respective corners,being suspicious of
one another. Thereis the scenario that youdescribed. On the other hand,
there also was another scenarioadvanced that some brokeragefirms will
specialize in executions and otherswill specialize in research.The institu-
tion will go to a researchbroker-dealer if it needs researchand will pay a
little bit more. Other peoplesaid that research really is not atremendously
expensive aspect of thebrokerage business asit now exists; thatthe
proportion of their expensesdevoted to that purpose is not verylarge; and
that consequently most firmsthat wanted to appeal toinstitutions would
continue to provide research.There was a feeling thatthe research
problems and openings in thisfield are so broad that noorganization can
have, in house, a completeresearch capacitynot eventhe biggest, let
alone the smallest, institution.Brokers who have particularygood research
in a particular area ofinterest, which might be aclass of securities, or
economic conditions, theMiddle East, or what have you,would get
business; and the businesswould be spread among brokerssimply because
no one brokercould do it all. That is thescenario I think we arelikely to
see.
JENKINS: I would like to refocusthe discussion somewhatand ask the
panel to evaluate the roleand the performance ofthe industry's own
central market advisory committee.This is serving an importantfinction
now, and manyof the positions we arediscussing today apparentlywill be
agreed upon before this committee.
ROWEN: Are you talkingabout the SEC's committee orthe Securities
Industry Association (SIA)committee, or both?
JENKINS: I was discussingthe SEC's; but if you care toaddress yourself
to the SIA's,I would appreciatethat too.
LOOMIS: One reason perhapsthat I have been a little reticent, or alittle
more so than Iwould care to be, is that Ido not want to appear tobe
pre-empting decisions thatthe committee willmake. That committee is
working very hard. I seecopies of their agendaswhich are, as is customary
in this business, inchesthick; and their problems aredifficult. I think it is a
very good committee.We hope a lot comesfrom it.I gather that they do
not find themselves ininstant agreement oneverything. They have agood
deal of work to do, but Ithink that they will be oneof the channels through
which whatIsaidin my speech will beaccomplished; thatis,the
commission does not dictatethese thingsf preferring torely on and benefit
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ROWEN: I think,from oursubcommittee's pointof view,ofcoursew
look to thecommission We thinkitis probablya good ideafor th commission to getexpert advice frompeople oUtit) the realworld,sto
speak. Thecommittee hassome excellent peopleon it, someof whomare
here today, andI am sure that their
deliberations and
recommendationsto
the commissionwill be useful.The commission,however, thenwilldecide
on their own whatthey want to do,whether theyare going tofolkwthose recommendationsor not, or modify themand goon from there.Ofcourse,
in our oversightcapacity we willbe lookingover the
commission's
shoulder.I am hopingthat thisprocessvillmove in agood,Sound,
constructiveway.
LOOMIS: WhenIsaid pre..empt,Irecognize andthe
commission
recognizes, butparticularly theCongressexpects that the
commission
ultimately willhave to makethe decisions;but wehaveappointeda
committee to adviseus and it wouldnot help thecommittee ifI wereto
say that they should
decide something,in someway, rightnow. NEWMAN: Wehave talkeda lot here about
restructunnga newcentral
market system,or financial markets,or whateverterm youchoose touse,
through theuse of communication
devices, machines,and variousother
applications oftechnology. Thereis still another
very importantfactor in
the business,however, andthat is itspeople.I amnot assumingthat
self-regulation isinfallibleor surveillanceis infallible,because ithas been
proven that it isnot. But doesthe SECenvision thatthey aregoing to have
a role, atsome point downthe line, insupervisingareas thatare now
self-regulated,either by theNASD or the
various exchanges?How welldo
you think peoplewho arecoming onto thissystem aregoing to betested
and regulatedand variousother assortedthings donethat arenecessary in
order to havea reasonably
well-functioningmarketsystem? LOOMIS: Ithink itwill begotten by
self-regulation.Ithink self-
regulation hasa part to playand isessential. Itdoesmany thingswhichwe
just cannotdo or donot wantto do. The
commission'soversight of
self-regulationprobably willbe a little
more comprehensivethan it has
been in thepast, becausethe Congressintends itto be thatway; but the
functionsyou describe,testing andqualifying,training, guidingand reg-
ulating, toa degree willcontinue tobe performedin the firstinstance by
self-regulation.The exact
self-regulatorystructure in thefuture isnot 100
percent clear.We willstart with theexistingstructure, theNASD toa
degree, but
particularly theexchanges.There willbe certainrules that will
have to becommon to the




subsidiaryfunctions oftesting,training,evaluating willbe allocatedamong
self-regulatorybodies is,I think,
essentiallya decision forthe industry.
BAKER: CanI sayone thing?On
self-regulation,I think thatthere is
some significant
dissatisfactionwithself-regulationas appliedto whatyoumight call economic matters, like rates and entries and so forth.I see the
long-term trend toward either leaving these questions to free markets or
putting them in the hands of the commission and keeping the self-
regulatory goal primarily oriented toward such things as health and safety
and similar kinds of issues.
ROWEN: Of the two choices, the better in my opinion is the free market,
not turning over such matters to the commission. And, I believe, there is
growing sentiment among a lot of people in the Congress and in govern-
ment in that direction.
PAINTER: Question for Harvey Rowen. One of the advantages of
regional markets stressed this morning has been their past and potential
capacity to develop innovative and competitive systems for clearance and
settlement of securities transactions. What effect,if any, do the current
legislative proposals have on effortsto eliminate the stock certificate
entirely? First, could you give us a summary of the status of the Senate and
House proposals to eliminate the certificate. Second, if the certificate is
eliminated, wouldn't this advantage to the regional exchanges in develop-
ing innovative clearance and settlement systems correspondingly diminish?
ROWEN: Number one, the Senate and the House have virtually identi-
cal provisions which call for elimination of the stock certificate as a means
of settlement between brokers and dealers by the end of 1976. The
longer-range plan was to try using the mutual fund approach. If a person
wants an engraved stock certificate and asks for it, he or she may haveit;
but in the absence of a request, that is, after we get some kind of evidence
of ownership, itis not engraved.
The second question.I am not so sure that the regional's role will be
diminished. There still has to be some method of getting the money from
the buyer to the seller, and the evidence of ownership transferred from the
old owner to the new owner. However that is to be done, it could be that
the regionals will be able to provide useful facilities for doing it; particu-
larly if you want to let local brokers clear regionally, and not require them
all to go to one particular geographic location, even if it is three thousand
miles away.
GREENE: Harvey, on a somewhat similar, related matter. You mentioned
pre-emption of state laws this morning. I wonder how far HR. 5050 goes
or what is contemplated with respect toother areas of state law; for
instance, the registration of broker-dealers and their registered representa-
tives in various states where they do business.If you have a black box
physically located in a state, or if you have access to a broker in New York,
or by a New York broker to the Pacific Exchange,and so on, does H.R.
5050 or your committee comtemplate any pre-emption of state regulation?
ROWEN: No. There was one specific section in the Senate bill that says
it shall not be a violation of securities laws or any other federal or statelaw
for a fiduciary money manager to pay something more than the lowest
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available brokeragecommission rate. Therest of the billdoesnot directly to differencesin state and federallaws.
GREENE: I think I willalso ask Harveysomething aboutthe
applicabjlit. of state tax lawsdepending on where theblack boxis. ROWEN: Yes, that istrue. There is somethingabout statetransferta. depending on wherethe clearing entitiesare located.
GREENE: Youmean it precludesa state from imposing
the tax? LOOMIS: It precludesa state from taxing solelyupon the basisof the fact that a blackbox is located withinits borders.
ROWEN: The blackbox is a clearingbox. It dealswith transfer
taxes GREENE: What doesthat do to NewYork City'stax on
executions? CALVIN: Just to helpout the panel, it tracksexisting NewYork law. does not makeany substantive change.
ROWEN: Therewas no thought on thepart of eitherhouse of
Congress to pre-empt statelaw or topre-empt blue-skycommissionsintheir registration of brokersand dealers.
WEST: We haveunderstandably spenta tremendousamount of timethis morning talkingabout very technicalkinds ofquestions. Yet,when Mr. Baker started thismorning he beganwith some fairly
philosophicalpoints about the regulatorand the relationship
between thosewho regulateand those whoare regulated. He talkedabout the kindof symbioticrelation.
ship he apparentlyfeels has existedover the years andthat sometimeshas not been in thepublic interest.I suppose ifyou read Nader
or Friedman you also wouldcome to that conclusion.I would liketo ask apolitical science question.Here we have theSEC. congressional
subcommittees,and
the JusticeDepartment movingfairly vigorously,all at thesame time, ina way
that frommy perspectiveappears to be at least
antithetical to thelargest vested interest in theindustry. How didthat happen?How couldwe get thesame
result in trucking?
ROWEN: It wouldtake, Isuppose, an afternoon
to discuss this.I think
there isa convergenceof various
things-.--events,human beings,and institutionsall ofwhich haveled us towhere weare. Howyou apply this
to otherareas...? I wouldnot know whereto begin. I haveno answer to
that rightnow.
LOOMIS: I thinkthat becauseof the natureof the SEC'srole at thestart,
which hasnot beenone of economic
regulation, andreferring to Don Baker's remarksabout thejampot,one of yourchairmen said,about 1958,
that all theSEC has topass out is trouble.As a resultof that, therehas been
a somewhatdifferentrelationship,althoughwe do have tobe sympathetic
with theessentialproblems ofthe industryand itsinstitutions.Sometimes
we have said,
unfortunatelyperhaps forour freedom ofaction, that thisis
an essentialindustry.